Sequence on moral anti-realism

Abstract

Last updated: 20/1/2022. This is the first post in my sequence on moral anti-realism. Introduction To start off this sequence, I want to give a short description of moral realism; I’ll be arguing against moral realism in later posts, and I want to clearly explain what it is I’m arguing against. When I’m arguing against moral realism, I will deliberately set aside some moral realist views and focus on those forms of moral realism that I find most relevant – in the sense that the “relevant” versions, if correct, would be the most relevant to effective altruism and to people’s lives in general. I will call these versions moral realism worthy of the name. Thus, I don’t claim that all versions of moral realism discussed in the academic literature are mistaken. The goal of this introductory post is threefold: 1. to give a quick overview of metaethics[1] and different versions of moral realism 2. to explain why I find many of these versions of moral realism only modestly relevant to ethical practice 3. to outline what I take to be moral realism worthy of the name Overview and summary Two definitions of moral realism * Moral realism has two common definitions: the semantic definition and the ontological one. I contrast these to illustrate how moral claims can be discussed at a linguistic level (“What do people mean when they make moral claims?” and a substantive level (“Given the objectivist assumption that moral claims refer to a speaker-independent moral reality, are they sometimes true?”).