Moral realism and AI alignment
Abstract
“Abstract”: Some have claimed that moral realism – roughly, the claim that moral claims can be true or false – would, if true, have implications for AI alignment research, such that moral realists might approach AI alignment differently than moral anti-realists. In this post, I briefly discuss different versions of moral realism based on what they imply about AI. I then go on to argue that pursuing moral-realism-inspired AI alignment would bypass philosophical and help resolve non-philosophical disagreements related to moral realism. Hence, even from a non-realist perspective, it is desirable that moral realists (and others who understand the relevant realist perspectives well enough) pursue moral-realism-inspired AI alignment research.
Cite this
@online{oesterheld-moral-realism-2018,
title = {Moral realism and AI alignment},
author = {Caspar Oesterheld},
url = {https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/DRmoA7Nqu85Sbuo7t/moral-realism-and-ai-alignment},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-09-01},
howpublished = {LessWrong},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {online}
}