Decision Theory and the Irrelevance of Impossible Outcomes
Abstract
One problem in the decision theory of Newcomb-like scenarios (i.e. the study of whether causal, evidential or some other decision theory is true) is that even the seemingly obvious basics are fiercely debated. Newcomb’s problem seems to be fundamental and the solution obvious (to both sides), and yet scholars disagree about its resolution. If we already fail at the basics, how can we ever settle this debate?
Cite this
@article{Oesterheld2017,
title = {Decision Theory and the Irrelevance of Impossible Outcomes},
author = {Caspar Oesterheld},
url = {https://casparoesterheld.com/2017/01/17/decision-theory-and-the-irrelevance-of-impossible-outcomes/},
year = {2017},
date = {2017-01-17},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}