Anthropic uncertainty in the Evidential Blackmail
Abstract
I’m currently writing a piece on anthropic uncertainty in Newcomb problems. The idea is that whenever someone simulates us to predict our actions, this leads us to have anthropic uncertainty about whether we’re in this simulation or not. (If we knew whether we were in the real world or in the simulation, then the simulation wouldn’t fulfill its purpose anymore.) This kind of reasoning changes quite a lot about the answers that decision theories give in predictive dilemmas. It makes their reasoning “more updateless ”, since they reason from a more impartial stance: a stance from which they don’t know their exact position in the thought experiment, yet.
Cite this
@article{Treutlein2017,
title = {Anthropic uncertainty in the Evidential Blackmail},
author = {Johannes Treutlein},
url = {https://casparoesterheld.com/2017/05/12/anthropic-uncertainty-in-the-evidential-blackmail/},
year = {2017},
date = {2017-05-12},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}